

25X1

TOP SECRET

25 March 1965

25X

Copy No. C



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY

25X1

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING
AND DECLASSIFICATION

TOP SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/08/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008200220001-6

Approved For Release 2002/08/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008200220001-6

25 March 1965

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

1. Vietnam: Peiping gives propaganda support to Viet Cong call for foreign assistance in prosecuting the war. (Page 1)

25X1

25X1

4. Notes: Bolivia; (Page 7)

25X1

25X1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

25 March 1965

*Vietnam: Peiping has given prompt propaganda support to the open call by the Viet Cong on 22 March for foreign assistance in prosecuting the war.

A 25 March party daily editorial in Peiping declared that the "Chinese people" will join in sending "all necessary material aid, including arms and all other war materiel, to the Viet Cong." The editorial was somewhat more cautious on the use of Chinese personnel in Vietnam, however, stating that Peiping was ready to send its "own men, whenever the South Vietnamese people want them."

Peiping's contingent pledge of manpower appears to be an effort to pressure Washington into halting the further introduction of US combat forces into Vietnam. According to the 22 March Viet Cong statement, the insurgents will call for foreign "troops" if the US continues to send its own forces to Vietnam and further "expands" the war.

The Chinese, on 24 March, also reiterated their position that negotiations for a peaceful settlement in Vietnam were impossible as long as US air attacks against the DRV continued, and US troops remained in South Vietnam.

Peiping's remarks on negotiations echoed a 23 March statement by the President of the Viet Cong's Liberation Front. He declared flatly that "all negotiations are useless as long as the US imperialists do not withdraw all the troops, weapons, and means of war" from South Vietnam.

He then added a new note to the Communist demands by insisting that the Liberation Front would

have to "have the decisive voice" in South Vietnamese affairs before a settlement could be achieved. Previously, the Communists had only insisted that the Front should take part in any settlement.

The Chinese Communists are continuing to belittle Soviet aid to the DRV. During an interview with Japanese correspondents on 24 March in Peiping, a senior official declared that Moscow had not given "serious" assistance to Hanoi thus far and called recent remarks by Soviet leaders about the possibility of sending "volunteers" to Vietnam "sensational statements" issued only after it was clear that the US could not win the war.

There is still no evidence to confirm Brezhnev's assertion on 23 March that the USSR "is already" assisting the DRV. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED] the Chinese were interfering with Soviet aid shipments. This may represent Soviet efforts to embarrass the Chinese. If true, however, these actions would reflect the intensity of the Chinese desire to prevent Moscow from regaining any influence with Hanoi. Such actions would risk an open Soviet denunciation of Chinese obstruction of aid to another socialist state and thus adversely affect Chinese-Vietnamese relations.

The Bloc states are acting in unison on the issue of the use of non-lethal gas against the Viet Cong. They apparently hope to make this a major propaganda issue. Editorials and commentaries from Hanoi, Peiping, and Moscow during the past two days have

(continued)

25 Mar 65

2

25X1

depicted the gas as "poisonous," and have assailed its use as "inhuman" and a "monstrous crime" against all the Vietnamese people. The bloc apparently hopes the issue can be blown up to the dimensions of the anti-US sentiment sparked by Communist "germ-warfare" charges during the Korean War.




25X1

Catholic leaders also continue to be basically unenthusiastic or even hostile to the Quat regime. A leader of northern Catholic refugees has claimed that the Quat government is a tool of the Buddhist Institute, which he suspects of maneuvering to eliminate Catholic influence from the government in alliance with certain generals. The possibility of another Catholic-led coup attempt cannot be excluded.

Viet Cong military activity continued yesterday at the low level noted throughout the past week. Government military activity is also at a lower level.

25X1



25 Mar 65

3



25X1

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

25X1

NOTES

*Bolivia: The commander of the armed forces, General Ovando, appears to be backing away from a confrontation with junta President Barrientos. Ovando is now under attack by the influential Nationalist Revolutionary Movement, which is urging Barrientos to send Ovando out of the country. It is possible, however, that Ovando's supporters may attempt to back him by force of arms.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25 Mar 65

7

25X1

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Administrator

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

STAT

Approved For Release 2002/08/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008200220001-6

Approved For Release 2002/08/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008200220001-6